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CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

WASHINGTON,. TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 1974

No. 55

Senate
ARMS REDUCTION, DETENTE
AND SALT
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, as
Senator JACKSON said in his address of
April 22 to the Overseas Press Club:
The issue facing us is not whether we want
a detente, but how to achieve a real detente
that will produce results favorable to a more
peaceful world.

We are now negotiating with the Soviets in SALT II, and the outcome of
these negotiations can decisively affect
the real meaning detente will have. I
believe it is of the utmost importance
that SALT II follow a course that is consistent with the national security of the
United States and the prospects for a
SALT II treaty based on United StatesSoviet equality.
In this spirit, Senator JACKSON has set
forth a U.S. SALT proposal to stabilize
the strategic balance through substantial reductions in the strategic forces of
both the United States and the Soviet
Union. As he said:
It is time for serious arms reductions ty
both sides-a stabilizing disarmament.

I wish to bring to the attention of my
colleagues the full text of Senator
JACKSON's constructive and statesmanlike address. I urge the widest reading
of his remarks. If agreed to, Senator
JACKSON's program would mark an historic turning point in East-West relations, and could dramatically increase
the confidence of all the world's people
in the prospects for a cooperative and
stable peace.
I ask unanimous consent that the full
text of Senator JACKSON's address be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the address
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
DETENTE AND SALT
(By Senator HENRY M. JACKSON)
In recent years, and especially in recent
months, the foreign policy of the Nixon Administration has been centered on the development of a relationship between East
and West which they have called detente. No
matter how hard or in which direction it has
been punched-in the Middle East, in the
SALT negotiations, on matters of human
rights-the foreign policy of the Administration has revolved, like a tether ball, around
the pole of that detente.
The detente hns gone from a dream to an
incantation Wltnout acquiring a definition

along the way. And we have been left without
a clear sense of where we are going or, for
that matter, a common understanding of
where we have been.
In its most fundamental sense detente
must mean a relaxation of tensions accompanied by an effort to achieve mutual
accommodation through the negotiating
process. Defined in this manner, as a process
'o f negotiation, it has the broad support of
til e American people. But like any process,
the process of detente must be judged by the
substantive results of the negotiations themselves and by the actual behavior that follows
after agreements are negotiated.
Thus the issue facing us is not whether we
want a deteu:;e, but how to act.teve a real
:l::tente that will produce results favorable
to !'\ more peaceful world.
The centerpiece oi the 1972 Moscow summit and the first test of the product of
detente was the treaty on anti-ballistic missiles and the interim agreement on strategic
of!'ensive weapons-SALT I. I had considerable misgivings about the SALT I outcome,
esnecially the interim agreement. The milita.·y advantage that the interim agreement
conferred on the Soviets was, in my judgment, an inauspicious beginning.
Now we are engaged in SALT rr; and it is
this set of negotiations, perhaps more than
any other, that will determine what real
meaning detente will have. I welcome this
opportunity to sha~·e with you a proposal
that could stabilize the strategic balance
through substantial reductions in the strate gic forces of both the United St::ttes and the
Soviet Union. In the course of my remarks
tonight, which are directed to the SALT II
negotiations, I have tried to develop a new
direction in the effort to bring strgtegic arms
under control-a direction based on the
search for the sort of wide-rang111g disarmament that would do much to bring us closer
to a genuine detente and a more peacefuL
world
In recent months we have seen the deVelopment by the Soviet Union of a significant number of new weapon systems incorporating· an impressive range of new and
costly technology. Not only have the Soviets
achieved a genuine MIRV capability, but
they have done so by developing two quite
distinct MIRV technologies. They have tested
a whole new generation of intercontinental
~allistic missiles, land and sea based, incorporating new technologies as well as new
launch techniques. They have developed a
mobile, land-based ICBM. They have moved
to increase by a very substantial factor the
throw weight of their missile forces despite
tre fact that they already enjoy a threefold
advantage in this area. These developments,
all of which have come to light since the
SALT interim agreement which was sup-

posed to limit offensive weapons, have, in- 2
dlvldually and in comt·inrttion, added signifi·cantly to the offensive potential of the S:JViet
missile forces.
In assess ing th8 si gnificance _of these developments, all of which are consistent with
:the often ambiguous terms of the SALT
'interim agreement, io is necessary to digress
.for a mament to consider the rationale by
which the interim agreement was defended.
The numerical disadvantage into which
the United States was frozen by the SALT
I Interim agreement was held by some to be
effectively offset by our technological superiority. The most obvious American technological advantage-obvious in part because
of the frequency with which Dr. Kissinger
reiterated it-lay in the fact that we had
achieved a MIRV capability and the Soviet
Union had not. Today our monopoly in MIRV
technology has vanisher! like last year's snow
and the lead in this area that we still possess
by virt.ue of our earlier development of
MIRVs can be expected to diminish rapidly
as time goes on. This Is neither novel nor
surprising. In the long run-made longer if
we find ourselves forced into a technological
arms race and shorter if we do not-technology tends to even out. That is the history
of technology; and it is, in particular, the
history of military technology. Given the
numbers and throw weights agreed to in the
SALT I interim agreement, under which the
Soviets enjoy a protected advantage, technological equality will mean Soviet superiorIty in strategic weapons.
In the final analysis, an arms control
agreement will not be stable if it freezes
for one side an advantage in quantity while
the other has to rely on an edge in quality
that it cannot maintain. In the interim
·agreement we agreed to Inferior numbers
but the Soviets did not agree to inferior
technology. We should never have presumed-I, for one, did not-that they would
fall to seek the combination of superior
numbers and comparable technology that
add up to overall superiority; and this is
precisely the direction that they have chosen.
In the current SALT II negotiations the
Soviets are seeking to consolidate the advantage they obtained in the interim agreement while pressing for equality in technology. Again and again when the interim
agreement was before the Senate I warned
that this would be the Soviet strategy at
SALT II. My amendment to the authorization for the Interim agreement placed the
Congress and the Administration on record
on this Issue by insisting that the interim
agreement was not an acceptable basis for a
SALT II treaty.
Now. with negotiations underway, we find
that, just as expected, the Soviets have actually hardened their position. Far from
viewing SALT II as an occasion to search
for the sort of stable strategic balance that
can result only from equality, they are insisting on a SALT II arrangement that would
widen and deepen their strategic margin still
further.
The response of the Administration to this
situation has been disappointing in the extreme. For rather than concentrating on thf'
design and presentation of an arms control
proposal that could form the basis for a
long-term stabilization of the strategic balance, the Administration bas concentrated
on quick-fix, short term proposals that can
be readied In time for the forthcoming June
summit meeting in Moscow.
In their desire to oreserve the imoression

of momentum in the SALT negotiations, the
Administration has abandoned its previous
conviction that the essential purpose of a
follow-on agreement should be to rectify the
imbalance of SALT I. In their haste to meet
an arbitrary and politically expedient selfimposed June deadline, the Administration
bas now begun to entertain Soviet proposals
which are inimical to the national security of
the United States and to the prospects for a
Sl.LT IJ treaty based on U.S.-Soviet equality.
Kept on such a course, SALT II is doomed
to fail in the supreme mission of reducing
the risk of mutual destruction. Indeed, instead of putting a damper on the arms race,
such a failure would add fuel to the fire.
Given this situation, I am persuaded the
time is ripe for the United States to put forward a bold and imaginative proposal for
serious disarmament-a proposal that will
test uncertain Soviet intentions by inviting
them to join with us in concluding a farreaching agreement to bring about a measure
of stability in the nuclear balance 'l.t sharply
reduced levels of strategic forces.
Instead of arms limitation agreements that
do not limit, it is time for serious arms reductions by both sides-a stabilizing disarmament.
In outlining my proposal it is useful to be·
gin by recalling the numbers agreed to under
the terms of the SALT I interim agreement,
according to which the United States may
have no more than 1,054 intercontinental
ballistic missiles. This force consists principally of Minuteman missiles that are
termed "light" (in contrast to "heavy") under the definitions worked out in conjunction
with the interim agreement. For their part,
the Soviets are permitted 1,618 intercontinental ballistic missiles of which approl\."imately 1,300 are of the "light" variety. The
other · 300 Soviet ICBMs are "heavy"-so
heavy, in fact, that these 300 alone carry as
much "throw weight" as the entire permitted
U.S. force of 1,000 Minuteman missiles. Wit!'
respect to the Soviet missile force the terms
"light" and "heavy" are misleading because
the missile that the Soviets apparently intend to deploy as a substitute in the "light"
category for the missiles in that category at
the time of the interim agreement are several
times more powerful, several times "heavier"
than our comparable systems.
At sea the interim agreement provides that
the United States may have up to 44 missilefiring nuclear submarines containing 710
launch tubes. The Soviets are permitted up
to 62 comparable submarines, with 950
launch tubes, in addition to a number of
older type submarines. The Soviets are now
engaged In building up to these levels.
I believe that strategic forces on both sides
are larger than they need to be, provided that
we can negotiate with the Soviets toward a
cammon ceiling at a sharply lower level.
'l he ref ore I propose that we invite the Soviets
to consider a SALT II agreement In which
~ach side would be limited to 800 ICBMs and
to no more than 560 submarine-launched
missiles, equivalent to 35 rnissile-fil'in"' submarines of the Poseidon type. Longorange
strategic bombers, which were not included
under the interim agreement, would also be
limited to 400 on each side. Because the
throw weight of the Soviet missile force is so
much greater than that of our own, the two
SALT delegations would be instructed to
negotiate a formula for varying these basic
numbers so as to bring the throw weight of
the two intercontinental strategic forces into
approximate equallty.
The numbers resulting from the negotiat

ing process need not be precisely the numbers 3 are not negotiable is premature; and there
outlined here, although I believe that signlfiare many who do not share this Judgment.
cant variation from these numbers, if essenAfter all, It was Henry Kissinger himself, who
tlal to successful negotiation, QUght to move warned-in his book The Necessity jot
in the direction of further reductions rather
Choice-that to reject sound proposals bethan upward adjustments. Because the stra·
cause they appeared to be non-negotiable
tegic forces of the countries are structurea
was to acquiesce in negotiating on Soviet
differently at present and because we are alterms.
ways searching for ways in which to reduce
Some weeks ago I urged the President to
the potential vulnerability of our deterrent. consider the program that I have outlined
the treatv need not follow the precise num- here tonight. The response has not been enhers for each type of weapon system I have couraging. The refusal of the Administration
suggested--so long as .the aggregate total of to consider seriously a program for Sovietintercontinental strategic launchers was American force reductions Is as dlsappolnt1,760 or less. Reductions to a level of equality ing as the tendency to seek a quick cosmetic
would be carried out, in phases, over a pe- agreement in June is dangerous.
riod of time to be negotiated.
There is no critical point for negotiations
that wm be passed if June comes and goes
A treaty renecttng tne essential features without a follow-on SALT arrangement.
that I have outlined here would represent There is nothing unique about the month
a real and significant step in the direction of June that would justify an extension of
of stabilizing disarmament. It would put to the SALT I interim agreement and th0reby
rest many of the misgivings that we now legitimize Its tertns beyond 1977 and prejhave that the Soviets are seeking to attain udice the prospects for a meaningful and
strategic superiority by consolidating their stabilizing SALT II treaty.
advantage in SALT I. It would permit both
I am not content to let the mat ter rest
sides to shift their resources from the build- upon the complex and multi-purpose judging up of nuclear arsenals to the building ments of an embattled WJ:Hte House. or with
up of their economies.
a Department of State whose passion for moThe Sovtet Union has turned to the United mentum Is sometimes Indifferent to the diStates for economic assistance, for our capi- rection in which It Is headed. I have today
tal, our agricultural produce and our ad- requested, as Chairman of the Arms Control
vanced technology. So long as the Soviets Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
support the greatly exaggerated military sec- Armed Services, that the Secretary of Detor of their economy at anything approaching fense undertake an Immediate and thorough
current levels, an American program of sub- assessment of my arms reduc t ion proposal
sidized economic transactions and the ~ran s  for transmission to the Subcommittee.
fer of sophisticated technology, whatever its
intended purpose, wlll inevitably amount to
Adoption of this proposal would m ark a
aid to the Russian army, naval and air forces . radical departure from the tentat ive and ofAt a time when the Soviet economy Is In ten marginal approach to arms control that
great difficulty we oug~t to be able to per- we have followed in SALT. Redu ction s on the
suade them that a reordering of their prior- scale I am proposing will encoun te r opposiities away from the military sector Is the tion , not least of all from t h ose In t h e milibest way to achieve economic well-being. tary services whose training, experience and
Adoption of my proposal could be an impor- orientat ion are likely to militat e against
tant step along a path that could lead even- strategic force reductions in genera l, a nd extually to bllllons of dollars in savings on tensive reductions In particular . While It
would be imprudent to discard the p rofesstrategic weapons systems.
It would ena ble us both to reorder our sional judgment of the military and irresponsible to Ignore t heir a dvice , I belie ve
priori ties.
that we must not allow their sk ep t icism w
If agreed to, It would mark a turning p oint
stand In the way of a proposal wh ich wlll enin U.S.-Soviet relations of historic propor- hance our security_
tions. It would carry us to the brink of peace
I am confide n t that Am erican m ili tary
Such an accord could transform the atmos- planners can be persuaded of t he advantages
phere of mistrust and apprehension that has of bilateral cutbacks In strategic weapons
clouded the horizon of East-West relation ': and that they too, In the final analysis, resince the end of World War II. It would add flect the hopes we all share for a more staImmeasurably to the confidence of both our ble strategic balance and a more peaceful
peoples, indeed, of all mankind, that the grim world. I would hope that the Soviet military,
prospect of thermonuclear war can be set which has been unreceptive to proposals
aside and our energies devoted to purposes such as this In the past, would give careful
more constructive and more enduring than consideration to the promise of a better life
the amassing of the weapons of war. It would for the Soviet people, who could be freed
be, if ever there was one, a genuine concep- from part of the enormous burden of the
tual breakthrough.
arms they now bear. Here the job of p ersu a In the new and more hopeful world that sion must fall to the Politburo, and to them
would result, we could look forward to a ~ am simply saying: Let us break wi th .t he
broadening of the foundation of mutual ac- troubled past and seek a more fru itful and
commodation, a deepening of the spirit of secure future for both our peoples .
cooperation In trade and commerce, science
and technology and the arts, and In the freer
movement of people and Ideas.
This is a program for the beginning of a
more peaceful world. It is worthy of our best
efforts. And I am committed to do whatever
I can to bring it about.
I am under no illusion about the difficulty
of negotiating an arms reduction agreement
along the lines outlined here. It wlll take
time and bard bargaining. The view of some
In the Administration that force reductions

